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Beyond Reason and Interest
JEREMY PAUL*
As is often the case with a work of genius, Pierre Schlag's The
Enchantment of Reason is both stunningly impressive and maddeningly
perplexing.' It cuts to the heart of all that happens within the legal acad-
emy (and sometimes beyond) by identifying our central, and, according
to Pierre, highly implausible, premise. Legal academicians and other
members of the culture in which we thrive speak "as if' life's most
difficult challenges are generally amenable to reasoned solutions.2
Pierre then thrills us with a deft display of the shallowness of such a
poorly disguised conceit. His reasoning is so good, his questions so
incisive, and his conclusions so inescapable, that after reading The
Enchantment of Reason an intellectually honest person would be hard-
pressed to continue participation in the business as usual game of the
American legal academy. This, I gather, is one of Pierre's goals.
But Pierre's book is cryptic, even silent, on the question of how to
escape rather than merely to describe the paradoxes and riddles he
illuminates. My fear then is that too many will come away from the
book with their academic practices intact, acting "as if' Pierre hadn't
said anything at all. In this brief essay, I will address those who would
dismiss Pierre's work as cynical and woefully short on positive program.
I will explain why I find not merely analytical clarity but political pas-
sion in Pierre's work. And I will explicitly call upon Pierre to take up
the challenges his own work suggests for all those wishing to turn such
passion toward useful projects in twenty-first century America.
I. PIERRE'S PROJECT
Disenchanted! The nooks and crannies of the word provide a win-
dow into The Enchantment of Reason. Certainly, Pierre reveals his own
* Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Professor of Law, University of Connecticut
School of Law. Thanks to Laura Dickinson, Michael Fischl, Tom Morawetz, and Carol Weisbrod
for helpful comments and sources, to Dennis Lynch and the University of Miami School of Law
for sponsoring an enchanting conference, to Michael and Pam Fischl for the hard work of
organizing and hosting, and above all to Pierre Schlag for risking disenchantment.
1. PIERRE SCHLAG, THE ENCHANTMENT OF REASON (1998) (hereinafter EOR).
2. For Pierre's fabulous coinage of the phrase "as if jurisprudence," see id. at 108-11. For a
noteworthy antecedent, consider HANS VAIHINGER, THE PHILOSOPHY OF "As IF," A SYSTEM OF
THE THEORETICAL, PRACTICAL, AND RELIGIOUS FICTIONS OF MANKIND (C.K. Ogden trans., 1925).
Of course, it was only a matter of time until "as if' became the name of a prime time network
television show.
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disenchantment with those he denominates "the partisans of reason."3
These professors and writers who dominate the legal academy are vener-
ated and well compensated for pretending that there are good reasons to
believe most problems have reasonable solutions. It's no surprise, Pierre
would have to admit, that Americans might be venerated and well com-
pensated for pretending. Tom Hanks and Julia Roberts come to mind.
But in the legal academy candor and reason are supposed to be the coin
of the realm. How can law professors go on day after day acting as if
profound political disagreements, such as those over abortion or the
proper distribution of wealth, are amenable to reasoned solutions? Why
don't they see that time and time again "reasons run out" but choices
still need to be made?
Pierre has an answer. None of us see that reasons run out because
we have all become "enchanted by reason." It starts like this. Everyone
recognizes the overwhelming dangers to safety and security posed by
political conflict. If you and I both lay claim to particular resources,
such as a plot of land or royalties from a joint venture, there must be
some method to determine which of our claims prevails. Violent physi-
cal conflict, in which the stronger party winds up with the spoils, is a
scary and unappealing way of resolving such disputes. And thus we
invent "the rule of law" pursuant to which we tell ourselves that con-
flicts can be resolved according to law, so as to shield us from the war of
all against all. The rule of law, in turn, means more to contemporary
ears than simply the positivist edicts of the state. We pride ourselves on
rule-following precisely because we have built a system in which the
rules themselves stem from procedures we believe defensible by reason.
Perhaps most crucially we count on judges to interpret the laws as if
they were the reasoned products of reasonable minds. But what if none
of this works?
Much of twentieth century American legal theory focused on
whether the law itself could provide sufficiently determinate answers so
that judges applying the law could be trusted to act reasonably, i.e.,
impartially and non-politically. But Pierre's attack is aimed at a deeper
level. He embraces the legal realist and critical legal studies theme that
the law contains many ambiguities that make it possible for judges to
decide particular cases in different ways. Much more important, how-
ever, is his eagerness to point out the law's lack of "reasoned" answers
to those who question its entire legitimacy or its claim to rule.
Imagine, as Pierre often does, the losing party in any case, continu-
ously asking "why" to every question posed, when told he must comply
3. EOR, supra note 1, at 41-59.
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by a judge.4 The judge says, "You must give up your claim to the land."
The loser asks "Why?" The judge says, "I have ruled against you." The
loser asks, "Why?" The judge says, "You failed to occupy the property
long enough to make out a claim of adverse possession." The loser says,
"Why does that matter?" (Note here the legal realist or cls losing party
would keep fighting within the legal framework looking for gaps in
adverse possession law, such as doubt over what's meant by "occupy-
ing," whereas Pierre's child-like loser raises the stakes by questioning
the legitimacy of the framework.) The judge says, "Under the laws of
property in this state, if you don't occupy the land for the required time,
I am obligated to return the land to the true title holder." The loser asks,
"Why should I be bound by the laws of this state?" The judge says, "As
a member of the community you have given tacit consent to abide by all
its laws in exchange for the protections afforded you under the law as a
citizen." The loser says, "Suppose I disagree with your notions of tacit
consent, or I want to revoke my consent, why do your views of political
theory prevail over mine?" At some point the exasperated judge is
going to give up trying to explain. But that's Pierre's real point. At the
level of political theory necessary to justify the entire set of laws of a
particular jurisdiction, disagreements among leading thinkers are
profound and not reconcilable. Pretending otherwise so that we can con-
tinue to believe that "reason rules" is part of our enchantment.
The Enchantment of Reason, however, is not a sustained inquiry
into whether it would be possible at the general level of political theory
to articulate principles that could justify, through use of reason, our par-
ticular political institutions. Thus, proponents of any one political the-
ory, such as one grounding obligations to obey in tacit consent, won't
find much that is responsive to their concerns. Pierre's astute eye turns
much more directly to comments made by contemporary legal academ-
ics aimed at convincing readers to follow one approach to the law or
another. These comments, he observes, consist of "unreasoned" state-
ments such as "the better view is" or "x concerns 'predominate' over
y."5 If mainstream academics don't have anything better to say in
defense of our legal institutions, why shouldn't we take Pierre's word
for it that our legal system cannot be derived from a single set of rea-
soned principles? Put another way, the problem is not that utilitarians,
rights thinkers, consent theorists, and the like, don't have answers to
many of the difficult problems in the political theory literature. It's that
4. One can imagine here the unfolding of an infinite regress akin to the four-year-old's
"Why, why, why?" For a while at least, reason can easily seem equal to the task: "Because,
because, because." Id. at 32.
5. Id.
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there are so many answers available from so many writers that only
divine providence could produce an actual set of legal institutions that
flowed directly from any one set of general principles.
Another way reason "enchants," Pierre observes, is in its effort to
adjudicate conflicts among what a more candid observer might call
"incommensurable" positions. You have only enough money to send
one of your two children to private school. One of your children is
academically gifted. A chance at better teachers and smaller classes
might start her on the road to the Ivy League. The other is socially
awkward and has trouble making friends. He might feel much more
comfortable in the smaller, private setting. Is there a way to tackle a
problem such as this by "reasoning" one's way through it? What if there
is not? Would it be psychologically helpful after making a decision for
me to pretend "as if' there were a reasoned approach?
Unsurprisingly, our legal system is making judgments concerning
such potentially incommensurable positions all the time. How, for
example, is a judge in a divorce case to balance one spouse's claim to
have "earned" money against the other spouse's claim that he "needs"
that same money? Are we better off telling ourselves that these deci-
sions are made on principle even if we can't articulate what that princi-
ple is? Suppose we decide that we are better off acting as if reason can
adjudicate such disputes because the alternative is too scary. We thus
adopt a worldview that pretends that hard choices are made on principle.
Have we done so because reason convinces us or because to pretend
reason works is in our own self-interest? And if the latter, then haven't
we already confessed our lack of faith in reason?
All of this, and so much more, is meant to leave us, Pierre's read-
ers, "disenchanted" as well. Pierre writes his book with an eye toward
breaking the spell that has us spinning out endless conjectures defending
or criticizing various legal positions. It's not just that such conjectures
are extraordinarily unlikely to have an effect on actual outcomes. It's
that there's a collective fantasy involved in having everyone pretend that
decisions within the legal system are often (or, Pierre might say, ever) a
product of so-called reasoned elaboration.
A question remains, of course, concerning just who Pierre thinks
his readers are and which folks he believes are actually under the spell
he's trying to break. He describes the enchantment of reason as a perva-
sive phenomenon. Yet his examples are drawn largely from the writing
of prominent, mainstream legal academics, a group whose influence it is
easy to overestimate. To criticize Pierre, however, for failing to analyze
whether feminists, legal services lawyers, or other marginal groups fall
equally under "reason's" sway, is, I think, to miss the point. Pierre's
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targets are chosen precisely because they are people with the most
invested in portraying the legal system as a product of reason. If the
system's primary champions find themselves often resorting to unrea-
soned arguments, then reason will be diminished in the eyes of us all. I
imagine Pierre hopes to find some prominent legal academics among his
readers, but I imagine as well that he hopes to provide a tool kit for
readers everywhere who now face an uphill battle in identifying legal
solutions beyond those embraced by the partisans of reason.
The harder question is why many readers would want to take up
Pierre's invitation to become "disenchanted." Most of us look forward
to an enchanting evening or dinner companion. Pierre's metaphor
reminds us that sometimes our enchanting companion (reason) may
deceive us or distract us from deeper, even disturbing, truths. But unless
we are confident in our ability to deal with those truths or certain that
our enchantment is somehow getting in our way, perhaps we prefer the
rapture of enchantment to the sense of disconnection that disenchant-
ment brings. If, as Pierre suggests, we are to restore reason to its right-
ful place as merely one tool among many for coping with life's conflicts,
then we need to push pretty hard on the question why.
II. PIERRE'S PARADOXES
Readers of The Enchantment of Reason will quickly discover that
Pierre is shy-almost bashful-about explicating the case for the nega-
tive consequences of over-reliance on reason. He begins the book with a
re-telling of Poe's story The Purloined Letter.6 In this story the police
prove unable to find a stolen letter because they rely on investigative
methods that have them searching in the wrong manner for the wrong
thing. The police assume the letter is hidden when actually it's in plain
sight. The police assume the letter is clean and readily identifiable. The
culprit, however, has actually crumpled the letter to make it appear as an
ordinary piece of paper. Poe's central character, Detective Dupin, tran-
scends the police's narrow-minded approach and locates the letter.
Pierre's readers are set up for a similar denouement. If we jettison our
over-reliance on reason, we too will locate the object of our quest.
Pierre, however, devotes little time to identifying just what it is that
we are searching for. Instead, and here's the book's first paradox, the
overwhelming thrust of Pierre's argument for why we should escape
enchantment is that it's simply not reasonable to believe too much in
reason. Pierre notes that much of life is shaped by other forces, such as
authority, tradition, custom, and experience. True enough. But what if
6. Id. at 2.
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another life-shaping force is "enchantment"? We let ourselves become
enchanted when it suits our interests to do so. Or with slightly less
hubris, we become enchanted because we simply can't help ourselves,
sort of like falling in love. Having someone point out that such enchant-
ment is not "reasonable" is unlikely to change our minds unless we have
committed ourselves fully to reason as a way of life. Such a commit-
ment, of course, is precisely what Pierre is warning us against.
Indeed, the paradox of writing a book stocked with ruthlessly
relentless reasoned arguments for the limits of human reason starts with
the book's title. Compare Allan Bloom's title, The Closing of the Ameri-
can Mind.7 This lengthy diatribe against political correctness and rela-
tivism on campus starts with the idea that certain people have taken
tolerance too far. Liberals started out wanting to be open-minded and
ended up becoming the opposite. But, of course, unless you are commit-
ted to the same goal of open-mindedness that motivated liberals to begin
with, you won't be at all upset to see the American mind "closing." You
might cheer instead. Similarly, Pierre scares us with the charge that we
have become "enchanted." At times, he compares contemporary com-
ments about reason to attacks on witches or defenses of phrenology.8
Yet it's our passionate commitment to reason that makes us recoil at
those examples. Pierre expects us to be haughty and certain in our uni-
fied disdain for the belief in witches. Yet doesn't this disdain flow
directly from the precise enchantment by reason that Pierre is at war
against?
Pierre remains undaunted by such a paradox precisely because he
wants us to see that our contemporary faith in reason is often little more
than faith. He is fully aware that he's playing with us with his examples,
but he has no qualms about using our faith against us. Many readers,
however, will wish he had bailed us out a little more by tackling the
question of what it means to believe in reason in just the right amount.
He's right, of course, that reason can't provide us with the right mix of
"rational frame construction" and "critical reflexivity." But of all peo-
ple, Pierre can't stop there. Certainly, he can't expect us to tone down
or lessen our faith in reason simply because it appears that a little "mod-
esty" is a reasonable thing. Put another way, it takes a great deal of
energy to reason one's way through Pierre's arguments. Reason alone
can't be sufficient grounds to make the effort. Only a victim of enchant-
ment would pursue reason at the expense of all other life goals. So
perhaps the right amount of reason is exactly the amount now spent by
7. ALLAN BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND (1988).
8. EOR, supra note 1, at 43 (witches); 62 (phrenology) (citing his own Pierre Schlag, Law
and Phrenology, 110 HARV. L. REV. 877 (1997)).
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the partisans of reason that leads them to the happy conclusion that we
live in a world making steady progress toward reasonable outcomes.
The standard by which we readers might determine whether Pierre's
critical stance is preferable to the apologies of the partisans of reason is
left too much in the background.
Consider a second paradox implicit in the way Pierre makes use of
the terms reason and interest. Pierre mocks the "partisans of reason" for
suggesting that continued faith in reasoned solutions is justified on
grounds that it's better than the alternatives.9 Pierre compares this to
Pascal's wager as an argument for the existence of God.' 0 One might be
better off believing in God, Pierre concedes. But this is hardly an argu-
ment that God actually exists. Similarly, we might all be better off if
human conflicts could be resolved through reason rather than through
violence. But, Pierre correctly points out, this tells us little about
whether we are able to reason our way to solutions. So far, so good.
The cases of God and reason, however, differ in an important
respect. Presumably, man's actions can do little to bring God into exis-
tence. Acting "as if' reason will solve human conflicts, however, might
make us reluctant to resort to reason's opposites (e.g., violence) and thus
produce a somewhat self-fulfilling prophecy. Moreover, it's hard to see
just what worries Pierre when he complains that Pascal's wager is an
appeal not to reason but to interest. For it is the blending of reason and
interest that stands at the root of the liberal tradition that Pierre is trying
to overturn.
Pierre's anti-Pascal argument starts out seductively. Suppose the
partisans of reason are trying to convince you that the American legal
system provides a fairer and better way of resolving disputes than other
available methods. You raise several counter-arguments suggesting, for
example, that much of the system is a hodge-podge based an accident,
inherited wealth, and so forth, and that there's no reason to suspect the
system reflects anything resembling a reasoned attempt at fairness.
Rather than respond on the merits, the partisans suggest to you that it's
in your self-interest to believe and act as if the American system is rea-
sonable. Acting otherwise, they suggest, is likely to unleash dangerous
political forces and perhaps result in outbreaks of ugliness or violence
that will prove uncontrollable. You then point out how feeble they
sound. They started off arguing that the system is reasonable, and they
have been reduced to arguing that it makes sense to pretend as much. In
short, you point out that the partisans have traded reason for interest.
9. Id. at 53-58.
10. Id.
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The reply, however, might be quite cutting. What else is reason
ever, the partisans might say, but an appeal to self-interest? Indeed, to
steal a phrase that Pierre uses throughout the book, interest is the ulti-
mate "unthought" that makes reason work. Although it is conventional
to pose reason against interest, each depends on the other in a reciprocal
relationship. It's true that if you are paying me too low a wage, I might
appeal to your reason, or your sense of fairness, as a way of getting you
to give me a raise. In such cases, we conceptualize reason as an antidote
to naked self-interest that might impel you to pay me as little as possi-
ble. But it's also true that unless I can count on you to be a person who
has some conception of self that includes a notion of your own interest, I
may not be able to communicate with you via reason at all.
Imagine another conversation, this time with a homeless person you
meet in a park. "How are you?" you ask the stranger. "I have ten fin-
gers," he answers. Already you know he is a bit odd, but his statement
is true and not yet inherently "unreasonable." "No, really, are you ok?"
you try again. "I have ten fingers," he replies. Taking a different tack,
you ask a possibly more helpful question. "Do you have a place to stay
tonight?" Again he tells you, "I have ten fingers." At this point, you
know this person does not converse normally. But you still don't know
why. Perhaps he thinks you are annoying and is pulling your leg. Per-
haps he gets a kick out of watching do-gooders squirm. So now you
point out to him that you are holding a baseball bat and that unless he
tells you something other than that he has ten fingers you are going to
hit him over the head. If again he says, "I have ten fingers," you might
now conclude (assuming he believes your threat) that he is actually
crazy. In short, it's when his reason fails to align with what seems to be
his obvious self-interest that you are most confident concluding that rea-
son has gone off the track.
Indeed, it's the reliability of reason and its link to self-interest that
has made reason such a powerful tool in the historic battle against the
forces of power, authority, tradition, custom, and so forth. The Hobbes-
ian sovereign, our iconic image of the all-powerful ruler, is slightly less
powerful than monarchs rooted in custom, precisely because Hobbes
justifies the sovereign's absolute rule with "reasoned" argument. I" Only
the sovereign, Hobbes tries to convince us, can protect us from the war
of all against all.' 2 Disobedience is thus never justified, unless the sov-
ereign is coming to kill you. In that case, since your interest in self-
preservation can never be overcome by reason, Hobbes understands your
11. See generally James Boyle, Thomas Hobbes and the Invented Tradition of Positivism:
Reflections on Language, Power, and Essentialism, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 383 (1987).
12. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 157 (Michael Oake Shott ed., 1974).
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right to fight back. Indeed, it's Hobbesian pessimism about the inability
to reason separately from interest that gives rise to the entire liberal tra-
dition in which government adjudicates conflicts according to rules
rather than some government imposed definition of the good.
One wonders then where Pierre gets his definition of reason against
which to compare the impure arguments of interest. Certainly, an argu-
ment that says to me, "believe x and your life will be better," is a differ-
ent argument than "believe x because it's true." Once again, however,
the latter truth claim presumes just the sort of antiseptic reason that
Pierre's The Enchantment of Reason is pitched against. Perhaps we
couldn't make it true that 2+2=5 even if doing so would eliminate pov-
erty, cure all the world's diseases, and put an end to war. But we would
hardly deserve excoriation for trying.
Pierre, however, points straightforwardly to the source of what I
called "antiseptic reason." It comes, Pierre might say, from the partisans
of reason themselves. It's those in the legal academy who pretend day
after day that the search for reasoned solutions, separate from interest,
distinguishes objective and hence sound argument from subjective and
thus biased partisanship. Pierre challenges this mainstream view in
ways that emphasize how the realists and cls scholars didn't go far
enough. They were right to highlight the ambiguities, indeterminacy,
and politics within law. But Pierre argues they continued to hold on to
the false hope that law could be reformed to eliminate many of its more
obvious embarrassments. Such reform is not where Pierre's heart is at.
He sees law's demands for allegedly objective solutions to questions that
have no objective answers as a fundamental contradiction dooming the
enterprise of law as we know it.
Here then is a third paradox for Pierre. His book appears aimed at
transforming practices within the legal academy. Yet he pushes as hard
as possible the point that argument alone cannot meaningfully transform
legal practice outside the academy. His book is a singing tribute to the
power of reason to make us stop and take notice. Yet in the same book
he is constantly warning us that it would not be possible to continue law
as it is without the sleights of hand that let reason pretend to be more
reasonable than it can ever be. Why couldn't we say the same thing
about the legal academy? It just wouldn't be possible to run large insti-
tutions funded by those committed to the "rule of law" in which the
teachers hold deep-seated convictions that such a "rule of law" was not
possible. In short, Piere's own book eloquently sets out reasons why his
arguments are unlikely to change anything.
This final point leaves readers wondering, why is Pierre so deeply
committed to intellectual honesty as the one value that trumps all others?
20031
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He seems sympathetic to lawyers who are forced through daily pressures
of practice to shade truth and so on to work within the system. Law
professors, however, he describes as being under no such pressures.
Thus he seems, as noted above, particularly disenchanted with our
unwillingness to speak the truth. Certainly, the protections of academic
tenure, the good salaries, and the general respect for intellectual bravado
make it much easier for professors to speak out. Professors who hide
their true feelings in pursuit of worldly glory (foolishly and unrealisti-
cally, Pierre notes) are hardly worthy of admiration. At the same time,
no serious critic would want to embrace some imaginary line between
the safety of the academy in which intellectual honesty is revered and
the rough and tumble of law practice in which guile reigns. Intellectual
honesty (compare reason) is a wonderful thing but it's only one value
among many others, including compassion for others, sympathy, serving
as a role model, acting as an agent of change, etc. (compare custom,
tradition, experience, power, authority, etc.). One wouldn't want to
become enchanted by it.
III. PIERRE'S PROMISE
Despite not having an answer for everything, Pierre does provide in
The Enchantment of Reason a sustained (if sometimes understated)
answer to one very important thing. What do we risk by becoming
enchanted with reason? The most dangerous enchantment, Pierre
argues, is the one in which contemporary liberals, law professors or oth-
erwise, routinely assume that reason is the best, indeed, the only, effec-
tive check on power. Pierre sees things very much the other way
around. "Reason is the compliment that interest pays to law in hopes of
earthly reward," Pierre notes, in one of the book's more memorable
lines.' 3 As this comment reveals, Pierre focuses our attention on the
apologetic character of reason and the ways in which it may lull us into
accepting the status quo. Nor is it hard to see why reformist liberals
might find reason so enticing.
Whatever one's political perspective, it's hard to overlook the gross
disparities in wealth, income, and power that characterize the world in
which we live. Accordingly, many political observers begin their analy-
sis of contemporary society by seeking techniques that might be availa-
ble to redress such inequalities. If one abandons either the feasibility or
the desirability of violent efforts by those at the bottom to seize power
from those at the top, then some effort at persuading, and thus reasoning
13. Peter Goodrich and Duncan Kennedy were both quick to remind me that Pierre is building
here on the famous maxim of Franqois, duc de La Rochefoucauld, "hypocrisy is the homage vice
pays to virtue." See JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS # 9529 (10th ed. 1919).
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with, those in power becomes inevitable. In one sense this is the grand
liberal project, or what today we might call the Rawlsian project, of
contemporary legal and political thought. Principles of fairness may
first be identified and devotees of those principles will then seek to
move society toward those principles through moral suasion. Pierre's
goal is to throw a big red caution flag in the path of such a view of social
transformation. It's not that Pierre himself might not come to see the
wisdom of a principle of justice that, let's say, prohibited inequalities
other than those which benefit people at the bottom of the scale. It's that
Pierre would be very suspicious of whether advocating such a principle
would be an effective technique for actually moving society in that
direction. Such advocacy might instead reinforce the unrealistic notion
that people in power are actually limited by rational principles. This in
turn may reduce the motivations of those at the bottom to actually try
and change things.
Now Pierre is hardly the first scholar to emphasize the apologetic
character of what passes for rational thought. Indeed, readers will relish
the way The Enchantment of Reason provides snapshots of Pierre's fore-
bearers, Freud, Marx, Nietzsche, Foucault, Derrida, Gadamer, Fish, and
Kennedy, and the way in which the book bonds these writers together as
part of a shared tradition. What makes Pierre special on this front is his
willingness to find fault not with a particular style of reasoning offered
by mainstream thought, but instead with the tendency of mainstream
intellectuals to fall in love with reason itself as the source of effective
resistance. This is a point he might have made more colloquially
through resort to simple psychological dynamics.
Imagine a set of rather dictatorial parents and a smart young child
seeking to grow and find her place in the world. Her parents are con-
stantly blocking her from trying new experiences. They often act largely
due to their own fears. But because they, too, are "enchanted by reason"
they find themselves often offering their daughter rationalizations about
what's actually best for her. She finds that these rationalizations some-
times provide her an opportunity to persuade them to change their
minds. She catches them in contradictions such as their love for new
worlds found within great literature, and she uses these contradictions to
get permission to travel to museums. She begins to believe she can tame
her parents' power through reasoned argument.
Alas, however, the time comes when an important decision, let's
say choosing what college to attend, pits her desire for a distant univer-
sity against her parents' need to have her close to home. This time, her
parents' fears inhibit their ability to hear her point of view. Nor, of
course, is there a neutral metric to weigh the gains she might experience
2003]
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from the stronger program at the distant college against the gains she
(and they) would experience from closer access to her family. Indeed,
as is so often the case in real life decisions, reason will, as Pierre
predicts, run out. If the daughter has convinced herself that only the
stronger reasoning will entitle her to go far away, she will indeed end up
closer to home. Her commitment to reason that proved so helpful before
will turn out to be crippling now. Only a break from her parents and
their traditional dialogue, reminiscent of the detective's break from
traditional methods in The Purloined Letter, will offer the girl the
chance to get away. What she needs may no longer be a proliferation of
reasons but an assertion of self. And reason will not be adequate to
adjudicate whether she should make the break or not.
In the end, The Enchantment of Reason is an argument concerning
our historical period that compares the situation of those seeking to
improve life for those at the bottom of the scale with the situation of the
daughter who wants to attend college far away. If we continue to pursue
the same old reasoning, Pierre contends, we will be dragged into endless
debates with those in power that we can never win. Having established
important rights, such as freedom of speech, we will find ourselves
defending corporate advertising for fear that otherwise free speech might
be lost. Or, as Pierre puts it so eloquently, we will find ourselves giving
spirit to the technocracy. 4 Having established important rights, such as
the right to hold tortfeasors accountable for injuries they cause, we will
find ourselves calculating human lives in terms of dollars and cents in
order to make the tort system actually function. Again, as Pierre elo-
quently complains, we will be aiding "the technocratization of spirit."' 5
What's called for instead, and what The Enchantment of Reason
attempts to provide, is a collective rejection of familiar debate. What we
are to replace it with remains undefined other than the very clear point
that there will be a collective recognition of the pitfalls familiar debate
routinely offers.
Now, Pierre is not so reductionist as to actually believe that any
particular historical period might be uniformly cast in terms, let's say, of
the daughter's need to become disenchanted. This is why he repeatedly
makes clear that he is attacking "the enchantment of reason" and not
reason itself. Certainly, we will still find lots of occasions where reason
can be turned to good advantage. In other words, reason will retain criti-
cal bite, even though it is also often apologetic. How will we tell which
is which? Similarly, Pierre understands, that power also often has its
good side. It's not enough to celebrate reason merely because it can be
14. EOR, supra note 1, at 93.
15. Id.
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shown in a particular case to be opposed to power. The parents might be
correct, let's say, to keep the daughter from traveling to dangerous lands
before she has the cognitive capacities to weigh the risks or to take nec-
essary precautions. Blind opposition to power is no better than blind
allegiance to reason.
What contemporary readers will want from Pierre then is deeper
exploration of what it means to choose among all the various sources of
decision that The Enchantment of Reason trumpets so often. If reason is
to rule no longer, how are political actors to decide when to follow expe-
rience, or authority, or tradition? Is this why Heinlein invented the term,,grok"? 6
Pierre will no doubt attempt to turn the question back upon the
reader. The choosing self that now finds itself with a smorgasbord of
options is, Pierre might say, just one more product of reason's enchant-
ment. Why, Pierre might ask, is all the focus of legal and political writ-
ing aimed at the mythic moment of choice when someone finally goes
left or right? Isn't it worth writing about how they got to that spot in the
first place? But this response, insightful as it is, just won't make the
problem go away. The very tools of linguistic communication that
Pierre adopts to make his case seem to demand a focus on the moment
of choice. If one writes a book, as Pierre has, presumably one imagines
that readers will be influenced by it. How are they likely to be truly
influenced unless at some point Pierre's ideas lead them to make one
choice that they otherwise might not have made? In short, the enterprise
in which Pierre is engaged assumes a reader with choices even if Pierre
wants it otherwise. Pierre could instead begin organizing political or
social institutions built on principles other than what he sees as
enchanted reason. Indeed, that might be a good place to direct his ener-
gies. But as long as he writes books on legal theory it seems fair to ask
him how these books might change our choices.
But if we have to wait for Pierre's next book for him to tell us what
it will feel like to make choices among reason, experience, authority,
power, tradition, custom, and so forth, he tells us quite a bit about what
such choices will not feel like. Initially, he might prefer the word "deci-
sions" over "choices," because the former term (like the word deciduous
applied to trees) reminds us of cutting off alternative paths rather than
simply living in a land of endless options. More important, the clear,
certain lines we have come to expect when reason points us in one direc-
tion or another will no longer be available. We will need to make politi-
cal decisions with humility, recognizing the profound possibility that an
alternative outcome might be preferable. Yet we must act on these deci-
16. ROBERT A. HEINLEIN, STRANGER IN A STRANGE LAND (1961).
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sions with passion, knowing that our political opponents can be no surer
of their preferred direction. In short, we must combine the deepest
doubts with the most emphatic righteous indignation. Only then will we
escape the enchantment of reason. While this lesson may seem straight-
forward to every self-respecting adolescent, we owe Pierre thanks for his
relentless efforts to teach it once again to those of us in the legal
academy.
